prosecution reflected a search for conduct according to various laws of war, rather than devolving into "extremes of brutality," as he writes on page 3, which have characterized more modern civil wars. Second, the war's political outcome in the constitutional end of slavery was possible, again, because of lawyers' prominent role in formulation of early Reconstruction policy in 1865.
Introduced by a prologue emphasizing how the 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas were a nationally publicized contest between two lawyers, the book's chapters are organized around several topics of the Civil War's development in which lawyerpoliticians played a prominent role. These were arguments over the legality of secession; the impact of lawyers on the respective presidential cabinets; the Lincoln administration's suspension of civilian law and prosecution of southern sympathizers John Merryman, Clement Memminger. But for Hoffer, the fact that Davis, though a former U.S. senator and secretary of war, was not a lawyer, contributed to his failure to organize his cabinet and to motivate southern state governors effectively to achieve the Confederacy's independence. Lincoln, for example, was trained to listen to dissents from his opinion before reaching decisions; Davis's closemindedness was notorious.
Hoffer also cites Davis's lack of legal training to explain his violation of accepted laws of war on at least two occasions concerning the Union military's enlistment of African Americanseven if Davis did not accept the Lieber Code, Swiss jurist Emmer de Vattel's widely known Laws of Nations (1758) was taught at West Point, the Confederate president's alma mater. The first was Davis's proclamation that Union General Benjamin Butler was a "common enemy of mankind," punishable by death, for treating slaves as war contraband. The second was his proclamation that captured African American soldiers and their white officers were not prisoners of war, but were to be prosecuted in accordance with the southern states' antebellum laws against encouraging or participating in slave insurrections.
Concerning the impact of lawyers' presence in positions of wartime leadership, Hoffer notes the decision of prominent southern lawyers Thomas and Howell Cobb and Laurence Keitt to join the Confederate military, rather than serve in the Confederate executive branch. In what he calls on page 68 a "highly speculative hypothesis," Hoffer suggests that these individuals' choice reflected the influence of a southern code of honor, piqued by northerners' criticisms of slavery, which "could only be defended on the field of battle." In other words, southern honor may have robbed the Confederate government of, as Hoffer puts it on the same page, "good lawyering," which could have made it far more efficient. This is an interesting counterfactual idea, though it implies that the South had manpower equivalent to the North's, or at least adequate to allow lawyer-politicians in the region to make the same choices about how to serve their government that Lincoln's men did.
Given the book's focus on northern lawyers' contributions to using the opportunity of the war to reshape the relationship of the federal government and the states, a reader may wish that Post-Civil War South and French Algeria 1865 -1900 ," American Nineteenth Century History 19 (2018 ), 81-104, DOI: 10.1080 /14664658.2018 . He may be contacted at tm-roberts@wiu.edu.
